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1972] NOTES
PERFECTION OF PURCHASE MONEY SECURITY
INTERESTS IN MOBILE HOMES UNDER SECTION
9-302 OF THE UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE
In recent years mobile homes have been estimated to account for more
than three-fourths of all new homes sold in the United States for $12,500
or less.' There were 412,690 mobile homes manufactured in the year 1969,
representing a four-fold increase in annual production since 1960.2 The
fact that a mobile home may be easily moved over the highway, yet is
designed and used principally as a stationary dwelling,3 has precipitated
several legal problems.4 One such problem has arisen under section 9-302
of the Uniform Commercial Code [hereinafter UCC] concerning the
perfection of a purchase money security interest 5 attendant to the sale of
a mobile home.
Section 9-302 attempts to co-ordinate the UCC security interest filing
provisions with various state certificate of title statutes by exempting
goods covered by certificate statutes from the filing provisions of the
UCC.6 Subsections (1)(d) and (3)(b-Alternatives A and B) were specifi-
cally drafted 7 to accomplish this desired co-ordination. Reference is made
'U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP., Mar. 11, 1968, at 82.
'UNITED STATES BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE UNITED
STATES: 1970, at 681 (91st ed. 1970).
'U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP., Mar. II, 1968, at 82.
4Legal problems, other than those which involve the perfection of security interests,
concerning mobile homes arise principally in the areas of taxation and zoning restrictions.
An interesting discussion of these problems is found in Bartke & Gage, Mobile Homes:
Zoning and Taxation, 55 CORNELL L. REv. 491 (1970).
5Non-purchase money security interests in vehicles pledged as collateral will not be
discussed in this Note. The UCC has operated after some initial difficulty to force most
states either to adopt certificate of title laws which require that all types of security interests
must be noted on the titles in order to perfect the interests or to eliminate such notation
requirements completely. In the latter situation perfection relating to motor vehicles may
be accomplished for non-purchase money security interests by the regular UCC filing provi-
sions. For a lucid discussion of non-purchase money security interests in motor vehicles
under the UCC, see Welsh, Security Interests in Motor Vehicles under Section 9-302 of the
Uniform Commercial Code, 37 U. CIN. L. REv. 265, 270-86 (1968) [hereinafter cited as
Welsh].
6
UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 9-302, Comment 8.
'Although earlier drafts of the UCC omit such provisions, the 1952 version and subse-
quent versions have included substantially the same filing provisions. See UNIFORM COM-
MERCIAL CODE §§ 9-302(l)(3), (2)(b) (1952 version); UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE §§ 9-
302(2)(b), [alternative (2)(b)] (1952 version, Supp. No. I); UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE
§§ 9-302(l)(d), (3)(b-Alternatives A & B) (1957 version); UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE
§§ 9-302(l)(d), (3)(b-Alternatives A& B) (1958 version); UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE
§§ 9-302(l)(d), (3)(b-Alternatives A & B) (1962 version).
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in these subsections to "motor vehicles," and the effect of the states'
varying definitions of "motor vehicles" upon these subsections' is thus of
major significance.
Of the forty-nine states' which have adopted the UCC, thirty-one
define "motor vehicles" as those vehicles which are self-propelled, 0 thus
apparently excluding mobile homes. A substantial number of states, on
the other hand, have definitions which specifically include trailers or mo-
bile homes as motor vehicles." A few other jurisdictions 12 have definitions
similar to that of Vermont, which states that a "motor vehicle [is a
vehicle] propelled or drawn by power other than muscular power .... ,,13
Such a definition may reasonably be said to include mobile homes, al-
though in New York, under a similar definition, the courts have until
'If mobile homes are not motor vehicles under a particular state's definition, the ques-
tion becomes how security interests in mobile homes may otherwise be perfected. Welsh at
286-90. But see I G. GILMORE, SECURITY INTERESTS IN PERSONAL PROPERTY § 20.8, at 576
(1965) [hereinafter cited as GILMORE]; see notes 24-29 and accompanying text infra.
'Louisiana has not adopted the UCC.
"The following states have adopted "self-propelled" definitions of motor vehicles which
are applicable to section 9-302: ALA. CODE tit. 36, § 1(21) (1958); ALASKA STAT.
§ 28.10.650(9) (1962); ARIz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 28-124 (1956); ARK. STAT. ANN. § 75-
102 (Repl. Vol. 1957); CAL. VEHICLE CODE § 415 (West 1971); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 21,
§ 101 (1953); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 317.011(21) (1968); HAWAII REV. STAT. § 286-2 (1968);
IDAHO CODE ANN. § 49-101(b) (1967); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 95 , § 1-146 (Smith-Hurd
1971); IND. ANN. STAT. § 47-1802(b) (Repl. Vol. 1965); IOWA CODE ANN. § 321.1(2)
(1966); KAN. STAT. ANN. 8-126(b) (1964); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 29, § 1(7) (Supp. 1970-
71); MD. ANN. CODE art. 66 , § 1-149 (Repl. Vol. 1970); MICH. STAT. ANN. § 9.1833
(Rev. Vol. 1968); Mo. STAT. ANN. § 301.010(15) (1963); NEv. REV. STAT. § 482.075
(1967); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 259:1 (XVII) (1966); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 64-1-6(b) (Repl.
Vol. 1960); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 47, § 23.1 (1962); ORE. REV. STAT. § 481.040 (1969);
PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 75, § 102 (1971); R.I. GEN. LAWS ANN. § 31-1-3(b) (1968); S.C. CODE
ANN. § 46-212 (1962); UTAH CODE ANN. § 41-1-1(b) (Repl. Vol. 1970); VA. CODE ANN.
§ 46.1-1(15) (Repl. Vol. 1967); WASH. REV. CODE § 46.04.320 (1967); W. VA. CODE ANN.
§ 17A-1-l(b) (1966); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 340.01(35) (1958); WYO. STAT. ANN. § 31-30(b)
(1957). The District of Columbia has a similar definition of motor vehicle. D.C. CODE ANN.
§ 40-101(a) (1967).
"COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-6-2(2) (1963); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 168.011(4) (1960);
MISS. CODE ANN. § 8125-236) (Supp. 1968); MONT. REV. CODES ANN. § 53-104 (Repl.
Vol. 1961); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 20-6 (Repl. Vol. 1965); N.D. CENT. CODE § 39-05-01(6)
(Supp. 1971); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 4505.01 (Baldwin 1971); S.D. CODE § 32-3-1(1)
(1967); TENN. CODE ANN. § 59-103(b) (Repl. Vol. 1968); TEX. PEN. CODE ANN. art. 1436-
1(1) (Supp. 1970).
"CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 14-1(26) (1958); GA. CODE ANN. § 68.101 (1967); Ky.
REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 186.010(4), (7)(a) (1969); MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 90, § 1 (1967) [see
note 16 infra.]; N.Y. PERSONAL PROP. LAW § 301(1) (McKinney 1962); 'VT. STAT. ANN.
tit. 23, § 4(15) (1967).
"VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 23, § 4(15) (1967).
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recently been inconsistent in their determination of the matter." In addi-
tion, two states have somewhat nebulous definitions, 5 the effects of which
are difficult to predict, while other states omit any reference to motor
vehicles in this section.'
Such varying definitions have a significant effect upon section 9-302
filing provisions applicable to the perfection of security interests in mobile
homes. The version of section 9-302(1)(d) which most states have
adopted 7 is as follows:
(I) A financing statement must be filed to perfect all security
interests except the following:
(d) a purchase money sedurity interest in consumer
"Recchio v. Manufacturers & Traders Trust Co., 55 Misc. 2d 788, 286 N.Y.S.2d 390
(Sup. Ct. 1968), held that mobile homes were not motor vehicles with respect to filing
requirements. In re Vinarsky, 287 F. Supp. 446 (N.D. N.Y. 1968), and Albany Discount
Corp. v. Mohawk Nat'l Bank, 54 Misc. 2d 238, 282 N.Y.S.2d 401 (Sup. Ct. 1967), held
that mobile homes were motor vehicles-in regard to filing requirements. New York rectified
the disparity when Recchio was reversed by the Appellate Division of the Supreme Court
[35 App. Div. 2d 769, 316 N.Y.S.2d 915 (1970)] and Albany Discount was upheld by the
Court of Appeals [28 N.Y.2d 222, 269 N.E.2d 809, 321 N.Y.S.2d 94 (1971)].
"Nebraska defines "motor vehicle" in two different statutes. Section 60-401 pertaining
to motor vehicle operator's licenses does not include trailers; however, section 60-501 per-
taining to motor vehicle safety responsibility does cover trailers. Neb. Rev. Stat. §§ 60-401,
60-501 (1968). New Jersey defines "motor vehicles" as including "all vehicles propelled
otherwise than by muscular power .. " N.J. STAT. ANN. § 39:1-I (1961). When consid-
ered alone this definition raises the question of whether vehicles pulled by other than muscu-
lar power fall within the definition of "propelled." "Motor-drawn vehicles" are defined in
the same statutory section as including trailers. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 39:1-1 (1961). The
indication would seem to be that mobile homes are not "motor vehicles," but the definition
of "motor vehicles" when read alone is unclear.
"
6
ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 11, § 9-302 (1964); MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 106, § 9-302
(1963); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 12A, § 9-302 (1963); ORE. REV. STAT. § 79.3020 (1970); VA.
CODE ANN. § 8.9-302 (Added Vol. 1965). In such a situation these states' definitions are
obviously irrelevant.
"rThe following statutory citations indicate the states adopting to a substantial degree
the 1962 version of section 9-302(1)(d) of the UCC and where such provisions may be found
in the respective state statutes: ALA. CODE tit. 7A, § 9-302(l)(d) (Added Vol. 1966); ALASKA
STAT. § 45.05.734(a)(4) (1962); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 44-3123(A)(4) (1967); ARK.
STAT. ANN. § 85-9-302(l)(d) (Addendum 1961); COLO. REV. STAT. § 155-9-302(l)(d)
(1963); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 42a-9-302(l)(d) (1958); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 5A, § 9-
302(l)(d) (Spec. UCC Pamphlet 1967); GA. CODE ANN. § 109A-9-302(l)(d) (1962);
IDAHO CODE ANN. § 28-9-302(l)(d) (1967); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 26, § 9-302(1)(d) (Smith-
Hurd 1963); IND. ANN. STAT. § 19-9-302(l)(d) (Repl. Vol. 1964); IowA CODE ANN. §
554.9302(l)(d) (1967); Ky. REv. STAT. ANN. § 355.9-302(l)(d) (1969); MD. ANN. CODE art.
95B, § 9-302(l)(d) (Repl. Vol. 1964); MIss. CODE ANN. § 41A:9-302(l)(d) (Spec. UCC
Supp. 1967); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 336.9-302(l)(d) (1966); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 400.9-
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goods; but filing is required for a fixture[8] under Section
9-313 or for a motor vehicle required to be licensed
19
It is clear that if a mobile home is a "motor vehicle," this provision
requires filing to perfect a purchase money security interest."0 While the
language in (1)(d) above, "required to be licensed," at first glance may
seem particularly relevant to unlicensed, seldom-moved mobile homes 2'
which fall within a state's definition of motor vehicles, in those cases
litigated it has not been accorded significance.
2 2
If, however, a mobile home is not considered ti be a motor vehicle, it
might logically come under the category of "consumer goods," purchase
money security interests in which are automatically perfected.2 Such a
result is undesirable generally because it would impede commercial prac-
tices and thus defeat the basic purpose of the UCC.2 1 Automatic perfec-
tion might seem to be acceptable to a lender financing the original pur-
chase of a mobile home; however, few institutions would consider financ-
ing the purchase of a used mobile home since there would be no adequate
means of determining the encumbrances upon it.25 Those financing the
original purchase would also find automatic perfection undesirable since
302(1)(d) (1965); MONT. REV. CODES ANN. § 87A-9-302(l)(d) (Repl. Vol. 1964); NEB. REV.
STAT. UCC § 9-302(l)(d) (Rev. Issue 1971); NEv. REV. STAT. § 104.9302(I)(d) (1967);
N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 382-A:9-302(l)(d) (1961); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 12A:9-302(1)(d)
(1962); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 50A-9-302(l)(d) (Repl. Vol. 1962); N.Y. U.C.C. § 9-302 (l)(d)
(McKinney 1964); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 25-9-302(l)(d) (Repl. Vol. 1965); N.D. CENT. CODE
§ 41-09-23(l)(d) (Repl. Vol. 1968); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 12A, § 9-302(l)(d) (1970); R.I.
GEN. LAWS ANN. § 6A-9-302(l)(d) (1969); S.C. CODE ANN. § 10.9-302(l)(d) (1966); S.D.
CODE § 57-37-4(4) (1967); TENN. CODE ANN. § 47-9-302(l)(d) (Repl. Vol. 1964); UTAH
CODE ANN. § 70A-9-302(l)(d) (Repl. Vol. 1968); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 9A, § 9-302(l)(d)
(1966); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 62A.9-302(l)(d) (Supp. 1970); W. VA. CODE ANN. § 46-
9-302(l)(d) (1966); WIs. STAT. ANN. § 409.302(l)(d) (1964). The District of Columbia also
adopted the 1962 version, D.C. CODE ANN. § 28:9-302(l)(d) (1967).
"The possibility of treating mobile homes as fixtures when they are being lived in and
are attached to real property by plumbing, etc. is outside the scope of this note. Perfection
of purchase money security interests in fixtures merely involves other UCC filing under
section 9-313, rather than the UCC provisions yielding to perfection by notation on state
certificates of title.
19UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 9-302(l)(d).
2See UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 9-302, Comment 4.
"See note 3 and accompanying text supra.
=Research indicates only New York cases have raised this specific point; see, e.g.,
Albany Discount Corp. v. Mohawk Nat'l Bank, 28 N.Y.2d 222, 269 N.E.2d 809, 321
N.Y.S.2d 94, 98 (1971).
"Welsh at 287.
24UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § I-102(2)(b); Welsh at 289.
2See generally Welsh at 287.
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section 9-307(2) of the UCC 26 may operate to allow the security interest
of a subsequent purchaser to prevail in certain circumstances in spite of
the prior perfection.Y Such undesirable treatment of mobile homes as
consumer goods is likely to occur in those twenty-one states28 which have
both a definition of motor vehicles based on self-propulsion and the
above-quoted version of section 9-302(1)(d).
In order to co-ordinate the UCC with previously existing state certifi-
cate of title statutes concerning the perfection of security interests in
motor vehicles, subsection (3)(b) of 9-302 exempts the subsection (l)(d)
filing requirement when state certificate statutes are available.29 Subsec-
tion (4) then provides that perfection of such security interests can only
be attained by compliance with the applicable state certificate statute
referred to by subsection (3)(b).11 Since before the UCC some of the states
merely allowed, while others required notation on a certificate of title for
perfection of a security interest in a motor vehicle, 3 the UCC provided
two alternative provisions for adoption as subsection (3)(b).
32
2Section 9-307(2) and Comment 3 (in part) are largely self-explanatory:
(2) In the case of consumer goods . . . a buyer takes free of a security
interest even though perfected if he buys without knowledge of the security
interest, for value and for his own personal, family or household purposes
. . . unless prior to the purchase the secured party has filed a financing
statement covering such goods.
UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 9-307(2).
As to purchase money security interests which are perfected without
filing under Section 9-302(l)(c) and (d): A secured party may file a financ-
ing statement (although filing is not required for perfection). If he does file,
all buyers take subject to the security interest. If he does not file, a buyer
who meets the qualifications stated in [9-307(2)] takes free of the security
interest.
UNIFORMI COMMERCIAL CODE § 9-307, Comment 3 (emphasis in original).
"UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 9-307, Comment 1; Welsh at 287 n.93.
'Those twenty-one states are: Alabama, Alaska, Arizona, Arkansas, Colorado, Dela-
ware, Illinois, Indiana, Maryland, Mississippi, Missouri, Nevada, New Hampshire, New
Mexico, North Dakota, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, South Carolina, Utah, Washington,
and Wisconsin. See Appendix A.
"UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 9-302, Comment 8.
'UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 9-302(4).
3'Six states (Alabama, Maine, Massachusetts, Minnesota, New York, and Rhode Is-
land) currently have not enacted any type of certificate of title laws. They rely solely upon
subsection (l)(d) to determine whether filing is required to perfect purchase money security
interests in mobile homes since they also have no central means of filing to which either
Alternative A or B in conjunction with subsection (4) can apply. To determine how such
security interests may be perfected, these states must generally look to other sections of the
UCC. I GILMORE § 20.1, at 553. The following sections of the UCC are relevant in this
regard: 4-208, 9-102(1)(b), 9-104(f), 9-113, 9-303, 9-304(1), 9-305, 9-307(2), and 9-313.
"
2UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 9-302, Alternative (2)(b), Reason (1952 version,
Supp. No. 1); see UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 9-302, Comment 8 (1962) version); I
GILMORE § 20.8, at 573.
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Alternative A to subsection (3)(b) has been adopted by thirty-seven
states- substantially as follows:
(3) The filing provisions of this Article do not apply to a security
interest in property subject to a statute
(b) of this state which provides for central filing of, or
which requires indication on a certificate of title of, such
security interests in such property.u
Alternative A was designed to be adopted by those states which have
"complete" certificate of title laws requiring all security interests to be
noted on the certificate in order to perfect such interests. a5 Under this
alternative the various types of definitions of "motor vehicles" have no
consequence for (3)(b) itself, since the term is not present in the wording
of Alternative A. If, however, a state's certificate of title act is applicable
by its own terms to mobile homes, Alternative A, when combined with
subsection (4), will operate to require that purchase money security inter-
ests be noted on the certificates of title as the exclusive means of perfec-
tion .
3
In order for the exclusiveness feature of subsection (4), as combined
=The following states have adopted Alternative A to section 9-302(3)(b): ALA. CODE
tit. 7A, § 9-302(3)(b) (Added Vol. 1966); ALASKA STAT. § 45.05-734(c)(2) (1962); ARIZ.
REV. STAT. ANN. § 44-3123(c)(2) (1967); ARK. STAT. ANN. § 85-9-302(3)(b) (Addendum
1961); CAL. COMM. CODE § 9302(3)(b) (West 1964); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 42a-9-
302(3)(b) (1958); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 5A, § 9-302(3)(b) (Spec. UCC Pamphlet 1967); GA.
CODE ANN. § 109A-9-302(3)(b) (1962); HAWAII REV. STAT. § 490:9-302(3)(b) (1968);
IDAHO CODE ANN. § 28-9-302 (3)(b) (1967); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 26, § 9-302(3)(b) (Smith-
Hurd 1963); Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. § 355.9-302(3)(b) (1969); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 11,
§ 9-302(3)(b) (1964); MD. ANN. CODE art. 95B, § 9-302(3)(b) (Repl. Vol. 1964); MASS.
ANN. LAWS ch. 106, § 9-302(3)(b) (1963); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 336.9-302(3)(b) (1966);
MISS. CODE ANN. § 41A:9-302(3)(b) (Spec. UCC Supp. 1967); MONT. REV. CODES ANN.
§ 87A-9-302(3)(b) (Repl. Vol. 1964); NEB. REV. STAT. UCC § 9-302(3)(b) (Rev. Issue
1971); NEV. REV. STAT. § 104.9302(3)(b)(1967); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 382-A:9-
302(3)(b) (1961); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 12A:9-302(3)(b) (1962); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 50A-9-
302(3)(b) (Repl. Vol. 1962); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 25-9-302(3)(b) (Repl. Vol. 1965); N.D.
CENT. CODE § 41-09-23(3)(b) (Repl. Vol. 1968); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 1309.21(c)(2)
(Baldwin 1971); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 12A, § 9-302(3)(b) (1963); ORE. REV. STAT.
§ 79.3020(3)(b) (1969); R.I. GEN. LAWS ANN. § 6A-9-302(3)(b) (1969); S.C. CODE ANN.
§ 10-9-302(3)(b) (1966); S.D. CODE § 57-37-7 (1967); TENN. CODE ANN. § 47-9-302(3)(b)
(Repl. Vol. 1964); TEx. Bus. & COMM. CODE § 9.302(c)(2) (1968); VA. CODE ANN. § 8.9-
302(3)(b) (Added Vol. 1965); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 62A.9-302(3)(b) (Supp. 1970); W.
'VA. CODE ANN. § 46-9-302(3)(b) (1966); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 409.302(3)(b) (1964).
"UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 9-302(3)(b - Alternative A) (1962 version).
" UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 9-302, Comment 8.
"UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 9-302, Comment 8; 1 GILMORE § 20.8, at 574.
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with subsection (3)(b), to exist, subsection (l)(d) must be treated as a filing
provision of the UCC.37 This allows the language of (3)(b) to cover what
would otherwise be within subsection (l)(d) so that (3)(b) can then take
precedence over (1)(d). In this regard Alternative A would exempt mobile
homes covered by certificate of title statutes from UCC filing provisions
even though such mobile homes would not be exempted under (1)(d) in a
state having a narrow definition of "motor vehicles." This results from
the direct reference by Alternative A to the state's certificate statute,
rather than to "motor vehicles." s Alternative B has been adopted in
substantially the same form by ten states: 39
(3) The filing provisions of this Article do not apply to a security
interest in property subject to a statute
(b) of this state which provides for central filing of secu-
rity interests in such property, or a motor vehicle which
is not inventory held for sale for which a certificate of title
is required under the statutes of this state if a notation of
such security interest can be indicated by a public official
on a certificate or duplicate thereof."
Alternative B when originally drafted was designed to operate upon "non-
mandatory" statutes (i.e. permissive statutes), which provided that nota-
tions could be made upon title certificates, so that the notation would
become the exclusive means of perfecting such security interests.4' The
states which had previously enacted "non-mandatory" certificate of title
statutes have since amended these statutes; thus all certificate statutes are
3rhe treatment of subsection (l)(d) as a filing provision in relation to vehicles is further
desirable since otherwise the subsection would be treated as an automatic perfection provi-
sion. Applying such an automatic perfection provision to vehicles, and in particular mobile
hdmes, which have relatively high resale value, is commercially inappropriate. See notes 23-
28 and accompanying text supra. Indeed, the wording "required to be licensed" coming
after "motor vehicle" in (1)(d) would tend to confirm that it was the UCC drafters' inten-
tion that subsection (l)(d) be regarded as a filing provision with respect to licensed mobile
property, while it was an automatic perfection provision with respect to other general
consumer goods.
21l GILMORE § 20.8 at 574.
'7Those states having adopted Alternative B are: COLO. REV. STAT. § 155-9-302(3)(b)
(1963); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 679.9-302(3)(b) (1966); IND. ANN. STAT. § 19-9-302(3)(b) (Repl.
Vol. 1964); IOWA CODE ANN. § 554.9302(3)(b) (1967); MICH. STAT. ANN. § 19.9302(3)(b)
(Rev. Vol. 1964); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 400.9-302(3)(b) (1965); N.Y. U.C.C. § 9-302(3)(b)
(McKinney 1964); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 12A, § 9-302(3)(b) (1970); UTAH CODE ANN.
§ 70A-9-302(3)(b) (Repl. Vol. 1968); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 9A, § 9-302(3)(b) (1966).
"
0UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 9-302(3)(b- Alternative B) (1962 version).
"UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 9-302, Comments 8 & 9.
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now "complete" in nature.42 Since Alternative B will also operate to co-
ordinate the UCC filing provisions with "complete" certificate of title
statutes,4" this alternative remains effective in the ten states mentioned
above.
Alternative B refers directly to "motor vehicles" rather than to a
certificate of title statute as provided under Alternative A.44 This leaves
both subsections (1)(d) and (3)(b-Alternative B) dependent upon the scope
of the term "motor vehicles." Since all vehicle certificate of title statutes
are now complete, perfection of purchase money security interests in mo-
bile homes which are not "motor vehicles" would seem to be unduly
complicated where the state has a certificate statute and has enacted
Alternative B. Clearly a security interest in such property must be noted
on the certificate in order to be perfected, thus precluding automatic
perfection under (1)(d). But if it is not treated as a consumer good and
not otherwise exempted, the filing of a financing statement may be re-
quired under filing provisions of the UCC. In the former instance it would
seem pointless for the UCC to provide automatic perfection. In the latter
instance it would be an undue burden upon creditors to require both filing
and notation under two separate systems in order to perfect one security
interest.
The interplay between the various states' definitions of "motor vehi-
cles," subsection (1)(d), alternatives of subsection (3)(b), and certificate of
title statutes has thus resulted in several conflicts. As previously discussed
these are: the limiting effect that narrow definitions of "motor vehicle"
have on subsection (l)(d) and (3)(b-Alternative B); the possibility that
mobile homes may be treated as consumer goods; the formal inconsis-
tency of Alternative A overriding subsection (1)(d); and the possibility of
requiring double perfection. In these areas of conflict there may be consid-
erable confusion and resulting litigation with respect to the method by
which perfection of purchase money security interests in mobile homes
should be accomplished.45 Several means are available to alleviate this
confusion arising under section 9-302. One remedy, which the District of
Columbia has adopted,46 would be to add "or trailer" to the term "motor
vehicle" when direct reference is made to the term under subsection (3)(b).
The meaning of such a version of (3)(b) could hardly be more clear.
"See Appendix A. It would seem that the existence of two alternatives is an anachron-
ism since all certificate of title statutes are "complete." PERMANENT EDITORIAL BOARD FOR
THE UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE-REVIEW COMMITTEE FOR ARTICLE 9 OF THE U.C.C.,
FINAL REPORT 238 (1971) [hereinafter cited as FINAL REPORT].
431 GILMORE § 20.8, at 575.
"See notes 35-38 and accompanying text supra.
4sSee generally Welsh at 289, 290; FINAL REPORT at 237.
"D.C. CODE ANN. § 28:9-302(3)(b) (1967).
NOTES
Another means to avoid the confusion of 9-302 would be the approach
taken by Kansas,47 which simply omitted the word "motor" from the
term "motor vehilcle." Most states have also defined "vehicles" in their
statutes, and such definitions generally are broad enough to include mo-
bile homes." Still another possible approach is to broaden the definition
of "motor vehicles" in the appropriate section of the state statutes re-
ferred to by section 9-30211 or, perhaps, to insert a specific definition of
"motor vehicles" in 9-302 itself, as Wyoming has done."
Although there are several alternatives to remedying the confusion
which surrounds the term "motor vehicles" in section 9-302, an approach
which is geared towards uniform adoption by the states may well be the
most desirable. 51 Uniformity of the law among jurisdictions is a basic
purpose of the UCC as adopted by most states.52 A uniform remedy would
simplify an out-of-state creditor's task of determining encumbrances
against a moljile home and, further, would allow a particular state court's
interpretation of such uniform remedial provisions to benefit other states
if they later face the same legal questions.
Such a uniform remedy has been proposed by the Review Committee
for Article 9 of the Uniform Commercial Code in the form of a new
version of subsection (3)(b). The proposed version of (3)(b) is as follows:
(3) The filing of a financing statement otherwise required by this
Article is not necessary or effective to perfect a security interest in
property subject to
(b) the following statutes of this state; [[list any certifi-
cate of title statute covering automobiles, trailers, mobile
homes, boats, farm tractors, or the like, and any central
filing statute]]; but during any period in which collateral
is inventory held for sale by a person who is in the business
of selling goods of that kind, the filing provisions of this
Article (Part 4) apply to a security interest in that collat-
eral created by him as a debtor.0
47KAN. STAT. ANN. § 84-9-302(3)(c) (Supp. 1971).
4'.Velsh at 288.
"Cf. Welsh at 289-90.
50WYo. STAT. ANN. § 34-9-302(5) (Supp. 1971).
5See Welsh at 290.
52
UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 1-102(2)(c).
mFINAL REPORT at 83 (note omitted). The filing provisions of subsection (4) read as
follows:
Compliance with a statute or treaty described in subsection (3) is
equivalent to the filing of a financing statement under this Article, and a
1972]
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The elimination of the two alternatives under this version would be a
major step toward achieving uniformity since only six states currently are
without any certificate of title legislation. 54 The proposed provision also
offers the safeguard of allowing the individual state to name the certificate
of title statute to which the UCC filing provisions shall yield. 55 When this
is combined with the lack of reference to "motor vehicles" which might
limit the scope of subsection (3)(b), it becomes impossible for a mobile
home which falls within a certificate of title statute not to be exempted
from the regular UCC filing requirements.58
The new provision is a response by the Review Committee to the
numerous criticisms section 9-302 of the UCC has received. 57 By propos-
ing the change in subsection (3)(b), the Review Committee has not taken
a specific position on whether mobile homes are "motor vehicles," but
instead leaves the individual states free to decide this matter for themse-
lves. 8 The Committee clearly stated that: "Public policy as to mobile
homes ought not now be frozen in a uniform Code."5 The proposed
subsection also removes any conflict between the UCC and the certificate
of title laws of a state by providing that the UCC will yield to the certifi-
cate laws.6" Any formal inconsistency which may have arisen between
subsection 1(d) and 3(b) has been resolved by the language in subsection
(3) itself, which clearly states that the provisions under subsection (3) will
prevail over subsection (l)(d).61
While there is confusion in the area of perfecting purchase money
security interests in mobile homes under section 9-302 of the UCC, 2 no
security interest in property subject to the statute or treaty can be perfected
only by compliance therewith, except as provided in Section 9-103 on
multiple state transactions. Duration and renewal of perfection of a secu-
rity interest perfected by compliance with the statute or treaty are governed
by the provisions of the statute or treaty; in other respects the security
interest is subject to this Article.
FINAL REPORT at 83.
"See note 31 supra.
FNAL REPORT at 238.
mSuch a possibility now exists where a state has a narrow definition of "motor vehicle"
and has adopted Alternative B to subsection (3)(b). The Review Committee's version of
subsection (3)(b) would also remove the possibility of courts in states with a narrow defini-
tion and Alternative A making an improper determination that mobile home security inter-
ests would not be exempt from UCC filing requirements. Such a determination is not
inconceivable because of the general confusion in this area.




60Sce note 55 and accompanying text supra.
"
1FINAL REPORT at 237.
62See generally Welsh at 289, 290; FINAL REPORT at 237; 1 GILMORE-§ 20.8 at 572.
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state need be without a remedy concerning such confusion. There are
several effective reforms which have been invoked by individual states, but
the real need, in light of the fact that the problem centers around provi-
sions of the Uniform Commercial Code, is for uniform remedial action.
The newly proposed provisions of the Review Committee offer an effective
and convenient means to that end.
EUGENE M. ELLIOTT, JR.
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